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ARTICLES
Measuring the Growth and Decay of
Transnational Norms Relevant to the Control
of Violence: A Prospectus for Research
CHARLES W. KEGLEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Modem jurisprudence is open to the scientific study of every phase of law
in society.'
Law has .. .lost much of its old appeal to intellectually gifted and
enterprising youth. Law as a science is widely distrusted or scorned,
sometimes feared, by representatives of other scientific disciplines as
some kind of secular priesthood.2
Despite occasional persuasive calls for the application of scien-
tific methodology to the analysis of the nexus between international
law and national behavior, 3 investigators operating from both the
legal tradition and the scientific paradigm have demonstrated a
marked reluctance to accept such research challenges. Many sociol-
ogical and epistemological factors can be readily identified for this
reluctance. Nevertheless, it may be submitted that the apparent an-
tagonism and methodological differences separating scientific and
legal analytical technique and scholarship are neither necessary nor
constructive, and that indeed the two orientations share more in
common with each other than members of either profession have been
prone to acknowledge. For instance, both traditional international
law and modern peace research share a common concern with the
maintenance of systemic stability; both law and science strive for
predictability; both law and science function to provide a consensus
about the empirical nature of the international system; and both
international legal theory and behavioral science assume that inter-
state behavior is governed by sufficient reietition and regularity to
render the search for nomothetic knowledge about those general pat-
terns of interstate practice to be a meaningful endeavor.4 Moreover,
* Associate Professor, Department of Government and International Studies,
University of South Carolina; B.A., American University, 1966; Ph.D., Syracuse Uni-
versity, 1971.
1. Lasswell & Arens, The Role of Sanction in Conflict Resolution, 11 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 27 (1967).
2. Aubert, Courts and Conflict Resolution, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 40, 50
(1967).
3. W. GOULD & M. BARKUN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1970).
4. Thus, when a legal theorist such as Kelsen insists that "states ought to behave
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when legal systems are interpreted as abstractions of social reality,5
then the complementarity of law and behavioral science becomes
apparent as cognizance is taken of the fact that both scientific theory
and international law bear some relation to, and reflect, actual
human conduct, or what states do in interaction.' Thus, because both
perspectives must necessarily probe the empirical association of
"norms of behavior" with "norms for behavior,"7 it follows that a
symbiotic relation between the two fields exists, in that knowledge
produced by one contributes to the growth of knowledge in the other.
Given this presumed complementarity of science and law, it
seems reasonable to this investigator to attempt to bridge the gap
between the two fields by applying the methodology of the former to
the study of the latter. That is, international legal norms may be
regarded as amenable to systematic empirical observation by rigorous
scientific procedure, so that transformations in the structure of the
normative order of the international system may be monitored.
Such an ambitious and perhaps pretentious goal is motivated by
a cluster of assumptions and convictions which may be briefly out-
lined here. A basic rationale for a study of this scope stems from the
normative conviction that interstate aggression poses a sufficient
threat to the survival of nations and mankind so as to render efforts
to control it and reduce its incidence a problem which must command
our immediate attention. The purpose of this study is not, however,
to defend that value statement. Rather, we contend that the realiza-
tion of that goal is contingent upon our prior ability to identify the
causes of violence among nations and to delineate those factors which
effectively serve to diminish its likelihood." One such factor, of
course, is the type of legal order operative in the international system.
It may be contended, however, that we do not as yet possess adequate
as they have customarily behaved," he is basing his theory on the scientific assumption
that the behavior of nations is patterned rather than idiosyncratic and that it is
possible in principle to derive generalizations about those behavioral propensities (i.e.,
customs) on the basis of empirical evidence.
5. Chroust, Law: Reason, Legalism, and the Legal Process, 74 ETHICS 1 (1963).
6. Barkun, International Norms: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 8 BACKGROUND
121 (1964).
7. Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34, 35 (K. Deutsch & S. Hoffman eds. 1971).
8. That is, if we wish to obtain the power to reduce the incidence and magnitude
of international conflict, we must first construct explanatory models of why war be-
tween nations occurs; if we can develop an adequate theory of why particular condi-
tions enhance the probability of the outbreak of war, it will inform us what variables
to manipulate in order to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Such a theory must deal
with the twin questions of (a) the extent to which legal norms modify national behavior
and (b) which types of legal orders have historically been most efficacious in restrain-
ing the resort to violence in the international system.
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knowledge about the linkage between international law on the one
hand, and interstate conflict and systemic stability on the other.
A cursory review of the literature suggests that conventional wis-
dom has been permitted to suffice for rigorous inquiry, with the result
that we possess an abundance of speculative insights concerning the
problem, many of which are contradictory,' but we have precious few
hypotheses which have been subjected to scientific verification to
ascertain their plausibility. Consequently, the role of international
law in interstate relations has a rich folklore, 0 but the extent of our
empirical knowledge about that role remains limited. Thus, if we are
to reduce the prospects for interstate aggression, we must first acquire
knowledge about the relationship of legal norms to national behavior
that is grounded on evidence rather than mere conjecture; we cannot
control violence until we can uncover the normative conditions which
facilitate or deter its occurence.
As a research strategy for acquiring such knowledge, it is further
assumed that it is most fruitful to attempt to systematically describe
the international legal order as it has evolved through time before one
attempts to delineate the causes and consequences of variations in
the structure of that order; description should precede explanation as
well as prediction" because until we can adequately map the world
legal system in its multifarious dimensions we are precluded from
cogently accounting for it and anticipating its future characteristics.
This tactic recommends an inductive approach to the systematic
description of international norms which assumes that the normative
system is open to observation and visual inspection. To assert that
the international legal order is amenable to observation is to contend
that that order constitutes a social datum which can be treated as
"an objective political concept," a view which Field" forcefully
argued many years ago but which remains controversial despite sup-
porting arguments by international lawyers 13 and political scien-
tists."4
9. For instance, compare the view of those who see the contemporary legal order
as serving to promote the perpetuation of the war/threat system with those who per-
ceive that order as a conflict reduction mechanism.
10. Fried, International Law-Neither Orphan nor Harlot, Neither Jailer nor
Never-Never Land, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 124.
11. J.D. SINGER, QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1-2 (1968); Singer, Modern
International War: From Conjecture to Explanation, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF QUINCY
WRIGHT 47 (A. Lepawsky ed. 1971); Rood & Kegley, Explaining War and Conflict: A
Review of Contemporary Studies, 7 HISTORICAL METHODS NEWSLETTER 25 (1974).
12. Field, Law as an Objective Political Concept, 43 Am. POL. SCIENCE REV. 229
(1949).
13. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND THE MINIMUM WORLD ORDER (1969);
H. KELSEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1961).
14. L. PYE & S. VERBA, POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 512-60
(1965).
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If indeed international legal norms are amenable to observation,
then the legal concepts are in principle also measurable. Measure-
ment is the sine qua non of scientific research. However, given the
symbolic nature of legal norms, it is submitted that measurement of
these rules should begin at the nominal level,' 5 with the classification
of the presence or absence of specific legal categories. And, finally,
since in dealing with international norms we are necessarily measur-
ing a systemic attribute (and therefore operating at the systems level
of analysis'"), we are consequently required to measure this character-
istic of the system in a longitudinal, or diachronic, fashion since
systemic features are only subject to variation across time." These
foregoing assumptions and convictions serve to rationalize and struc-
ture the research design characteristics that are proposed to study the
growth and decay of transnational norms bearing on the control of
interstate violence.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING TRANSNATIONAL NORMS
Devising an explicit definition of legal norms which permits codi-
fication of its content for a specific temporal span is a seemingly
intractable task. Principles of international law are conventionally
couched in a broad abstract manner, rendering them imprecise, non-
exhaustive, contradictory and elastic;'" moreover, the problem of def-
inition of what rules exist is exacerbated by the simultaneous pres-
ence of diverse cultural and legal orders in the international system. I9
Consequently, efforts to authoritatively define the "sanctioned pre-
scriptions for, or prohibitions against, others' behavior, belief or feel-
ing' 26 operative in the international legal system at a particular point
15. Typology construction is conveniently considered to be the most appropriate
first requisite in the scientific study of any phenomena, and is often conceived as a
form of measurement itself. C. KEGLEY, JR., A GENERAL EMPIRICAL TYPOLOGY OF FOR-
EIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR (1973); Kalleberg, The Logic of Comparison, 19 WORLD POLITICS
69, 73 (1966).
16. Singer, The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations, in THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THEORETICAL ESSAYS 77 (K. Knorr & S. Verba eds. 1961).
17. Ray & Singer, Aggregation and Inference: The Levels-of-Analysis Problem
Revisited, March 1973 (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meet-
ing of the International Studies Association, New York).
18. R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 7-40 (1970); Falk, The
Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law: Gaps in Legal Thinking,
50 VA. L. REV. 231 (1964). As Nader and Metzger summarized this idea, within a single
society several legal systems may be operating, "complementing, supplementing, or
conflicting with each other." Nader & Metzger, Conflict Resolution in Two Mexican
Communities, 65 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 584 (1963).
19. A. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (1960); McDou-
gal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959).
20. Morris, A Typology of Norms, 21 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 610 (1956).
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in time appear nearly hopeless,2 the contributions of some toward
this goal notwithstanding.
Given the difficulties of devising a system for distinguishing legal
from illegal forms of behavior, as well as our primary interest in the
relation between normative ideas and action, it is advisable to con-
struct a concept of norms which skirts the above problems and which
lends itself more fruitfully to observation and measurement. This
may be partially accomplished by jettisoning constitutive definitions
of transnational norms which seek to demarcate what conduct the
legal order prohibits for a functional definition which depicts norms
according to the function(s) or task(s) they perform in the system.
Here, if law is seen, in its ultimate essence, as crystallized public
opinion, then one of the salient functions of transnational legal norms
is the communication and articulation of prevailing beliefs regarding
the nature of the international system and the appropriate behavior
of members comprising it. That is, transnational legal norms serve
the purposes of indicating what fundamental beliefs about required
and appropriate behavior are operative and of inculcating an aware-
ness among members of international society that there is community
support for particular beliefs.2
In adopting this conception we thus adhere to the view expressed
by Coplin that" . . . the primary function of international law is as
a communication technique."2 3 As Coplin elaborated,
• ..the laws of a society help to express and develop a climate of opinion
about the society, that is, a set of attitudes about the nature of the society
.... Law reaches all members of the society .... Just as law, along
with governmental institutions in democratic societies aids in developing
and communicating a consensus on the nature of the state system...
international law expresses a set of ideas about the nature of the interna-
tional system generally held throughout the system. Through interna-
tional law and international organizations, a basic set of ideas concerning
the values and patterns of the international system is communicated to
the members of the system. Moreover, as the international system devel-
ops to new forms in the rapidly changing contemporary environment, the
law and its related institutions aid in developing agreement on the chang-
ing nature of international relations. 4
21. To dramatize the magnitude of the task of codifying legal norms in such a way
as to organize, digest, collate, and eliminate obscure views and discrepancies, it is
instructive to recall that Justinian is reported to have compiled CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS
under ideal circumstances (i.e., conditions of systemic universality) only with an army
of legal experts after prolonged inquiry, and at that time (527 A.D.) it was necessary
to condense 2,000 books consisting of 3,000,000 lines to 150,000 lines. Rhyne, Peace
With Justice, 28 ViTAl, SPEECHES OF THE DAY 462 (1962).
22. This conception follows closely Katz and Kahn's definition of norms as a
statistical commonality of beliefs. D. KAU & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (1966).
23. W. COPLIN, THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (1966).
24. Id. at 168-71.
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Seen in this light, transnational norms thus serve
as authoritative (i.e., accepted as such by the community) modes of
communicating or reflecting the ideals and purposes, the acceptable roles
and actions, as well as the very processes of the societies. The legal system
functions on the level of the individual's perceptions and attitudes by
presenting to him an image of the social system - an image which has
both factual and normative aspects and which contributes to social order
by building a consensus on procedural as well as on substantive matters. '5
This conception depicts transnational norms as indicators of the
nature of the international system during particular temporal peri-
ods, rather than as a system of coercive norms with sanctions for their
enforcement. The conception sees norms fostering the creation of an
image held by members of the system regarding the global system of
which they are a part, 6 rather than identifying clear limits to permis-
sible behavior or operating as a restraint system. This functional
definition of norms therefore perceives of norms as contributing to the
development of an international political culture." As an attitudinal
variable, transnational norms define the international political cul-
ture or "climate of opinion" by specifying the beliefs which members
of the system hold about the relations between nations. As Verba
phrased it:
The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical be-
liefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which
political action takes place . . . . It refers not to what is happening in
the world of politics, but what people believe about those happenings.
And these beliefs can be of several kinds: they can be empirical beliefs
about what the actual state of political life is; they can be beliefs as to
the goals or values that ought to be pursued in political life; and these
beliefs may have an important expressive or emotional dimension.2"
It is this conception of transnational norms that is proposed for
employment in the present study. It allows us to investigate the rela-
tionship between normative belief systems regarding violent behavior
and the conduct of behavior without raising questions concerning the
status and/or universality of particular legal stipulations. That is,
when we treat norms as attitudinal characteristics of the interna-
tional system, we can probe the statistical association between beliefs
and behavior while concomitantly avoiding legalistic discussions
about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the beliefs themselves. The use
of such norms, which hereafter will be termed "transnational rules"
in order to attempt to circumvent the semantic confusion associated
25. Coplin, International Law and Assumptions About the State System, 17
WORLD POLITIcs 615 (1965).
26. Boulding, National Images and International Systems, in A MULTI-METHOD
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITIcs 366 (W. Coplin & C. Kegley, Jr. eds. 1971).
27. W. COPLIN, supra note 23, at 168-95.
28. L. PE & S. VERBA, supra note 14, at 513, 516.
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with the conventional meaning of the terms "law" and "norms," 2
thus enables us to ultimately investigate our central empirical ques-
tion, namely, the relation between the prevalence of various types of
transnational rules or normative ideas and the level of systemic ag-
gression in the system. Thus, this conceptual orientation permits
investigation into the related generic questions of the structural de-
terminants and consequences of transnational rules, of the temporal
connection between rules and conduct (i.e., do rules of behavior be-
come rules for behavior, or do international rules instead merely legit-
imate the status quo by condoning diplomatic practice), and of the
relationship between the extent of behavioral conformity and norma-
tive identification (i.e., does the system, as Hoebel suggests, 0 per-
form according to the prescription, "What the most do, others should
do?").
III. OPERATIONALIZING THE CONCEPT OF TRANSNATIONAL RULES
Durkheim is reported to have once contended that:
Moral facts are facts like any others; they consist of rules of action which
can be recognized by some distinctive characteristics; thus, it must be
possible to observe them, to describe and classify them."
Such reasoning, if valid, would appear to apply equally well to the
measurement of the transnational rules or international beliefs com-
prising the international political culture. What is required for the
operationalization of transnational rules is a definition specifying a
technique for identifying the contents of transnational rules as well
as a set of procedures by which source material which is publicly
available could be systemically coded by replicable methods of obser-
vation and classification for the conversion of such source information
into quantitative data.
When transnational rules are conceived as reflections of systemic
images and global beliefs about the kinds of permissible foreign pol-
icy behavior of states, then evidence of those rules, and transforma-
tions in them, it is submitted, may be derived from what interna-
tional jurists and publicists report about them in international legal
texts. That is, authoritative classical legal texts may serve as a data
source from which indicators and measures can be constructed of the
attitudes which prevailed about the nature of international political
behavior at the time they were written. While such treatises may not
accurately reflect whatever body of law may have been operative at
a given point in historical time in the international system, the obser-
vations and interpretations provided by these scholars provide an
29. Goldman, International Norms and Governmental Behaviour, 4 COOPERATION
& CONFLICT 162 (1969).
30. E.A. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954).
31. M. OSSAWSKA, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF MORAL IDEAS 17 (1970).
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index of the perceived rules which statesmen regarded as important
in regulating the relations of nations. As such, then, if the descriptive
information found in these legal texts are interpreted not as full,
exact summaries of the law of nations, but rather as opinions about
the system and its characteristic or standard operating rules, then the
descriptions may serve as evidence of the transnational rules extant
in particular temporal spans. These descriptive accounts and obser-
vations are amenable to quantification for systematic data collection.
The conversion of this source information into quantitative data
is a complicated process. The operational instructions are described
fully in the Coder's Manual of the Transnational Rules Indicators
Project" which outlines the procedure by which the contents of tex-
tual material found in classic legal texts are screened and codified for
184 variables. Basically, the operational technique is that of thematic
content analysis, an analytic and data generation procedure for sys-
tematically scanning documents and quantatively profiling their con-
tents by replicable procedures of observation and classification. The
technique has been described fully elsewhere. 3 When international
legal texts are subjected to the technique, the authors are conceived
as experts and their descriptions are treated as observations which,
when coded, are thereby measured along specific dimensions. The
coding rules articulated in the Coder's Manual delineate these opera-
tional rules by which various features of transnational rules are mea-
sured to generate data regarding the presence, absence, and intensity
with which particular beliefs concerning appropriate interstate be-
havior were perceived to prevail at the time the scholar was express-
ing his opinions.
This approach to operationalization of the transnational rules
concept raises a number of issues, most of which center on the prob-
lems of construct validity. An obvious distance necessarily pertains
between concept and operational indicator. A number of considera-
tions suggest that the operationalization is valid, on the face of it,
however. In particular, the operationalization may be defended and
rationalized in the following terms.
(1) There is a relatively close fit between transnational rules
defined in terms of their communicative function, and the informa-
tion provided by text-writers. The information and opinions exressed
by textbook writers are not treated as descriptions of what the law
is, but rather as quasi-authoritative statements of the assumptions
32. C. KEGLEY. JR.. K. CHoI & G. RAYMOND, A CODER'S MANUAL FOR TRANSNA-
TIONAL RULES INDICATORS PROJECT (TRIP) (1974).
33. B. BERELSON, CONTENT ANALYSIS IN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH (1952); H. LAS-
SWELL, LANGUAGE OF POLITICS: STUDIES IN QUANTITATIVE SEMANTICS (1949); R. NORTH,
CONTENT ANALYSIS (1963); I. POOL, TRENDS IN CONTENT ANALYSIS (1959).
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policy-makers held about the nature and normative rules of the sys-
tem in a particular period of history. From this perspective, we agree
with Coplin that the writings of jurists may be seen
* . . as an institutional device for communicating to the policy-makers
of various states a consensus on the nature of the international system.
It is a "quasi-authoritative" device because the norms of international
law represent only an imperfect consensus of the community of states, a
consensus which rarely commands complete acceptance but which
usually expresses generally held ideas. Given the decentralized nature of
law-creation and law-application in the international community, there
is no official voice of the states as a collectivity. However, international
law taken as a body of generally related norms is the closest thing to such
a voice. Therefore, in spite of the degree of uncertainty about the author-
ity of international law, it may still be meaningful to examine interna-
tional law as a means for expressing the commonly held assumptions
about the state system.Y
We are, thus, not seeking to measure and quantify international law;
rather, the concept and indicator relate to the opinions about the
system made by those qualified by their experience and research to
summarize the operating behavioral practices and rules of the sys-
tem.
(2) Such a conceptual orientation is warranted because it avoids
the "essentialist fallacy" of which logicians speak when they refer to
attempts of people to seek "correct" or "true" definitions of concepts.
That is, we are not trying to answer the question, "What is law?" It
may be contended that is "an ill-conceived or a wrong-headed ques-
tion in the first place," because:
It becomes fairly plain that the attempt to define "law," like similar
attempts to define "art" and "religion," should be abandoned at least if
the traditional tight genus-specie kind of definition is attempted. "Law"
simply has no genus. Hence, we may more profitably inquire into the use
of such words as "law" and "ethics," and analyze these as concepts. So
avoiding the error, derived in part from Aristotle of seeking a "correct"
or "true" definition, on the fallacy of nouns and referents, namely, of
assuming that there is an object (law) which must point to certain (un-
changeable) objects, we use an open texture approach . . . .We should
ask only how any given word has been used, is used, or, we may propose,
ought to be used in a given context. We cease to ask what it "means" -
as if it always and everywhere possessed a certain meaning2'
From this posture, then, the way in which legal scholars attempt to
describe international conduct, rather than the meaning of law in a
particular time frame, is what we seek to tap; such an approach
avoids the dangers identified above.
34. Coplin, supra note 25, at 618-19.
35. Kegley, Observations on Legal viv-a-vis Moral Thought and Life, 51
PERSONALIST 58 (1970).
36. Id. at 61-62.
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(3) The use of textbook writers' opinions as a data source recom-
mends itself because of the absence of an alternate source from which
to extract information about the rules prevailing through time. Legal
scholars comprise the only profession which have traditionally sought
to monitor changes in the rules and conduct of interstate behavior.
While, to be sure, diplomatic history provides some clues on this
dimension of international relations3 7 and the memoirs of policy-
makers provide information about the "standing rules of procedure"
they perceived to influence their behavior, 3 this information is not
systematic and not readily amenable to comparative historical sur-
vey. Hence, international legal texts serve as the only source from
which evidence about the norms regulating behavior may be ex-
tracted. Within international law itself, the statements of textbook
writers are seen as serving to provide useful evidence of what legal
norms are operative; 31 more importantly, for our purposes, these
statements are seen as "helping to create the opinion by which the
range of consensus is enlarged."' 0 That is, international law regards
the writings of textbooks as evidence of legal norms and as modifiers
of opinion about the conduct of states. This fits with our desire to
extract data about the psycho-cultural attributes" of the interna-
tional system.
(4) It has been convincingly argued" that the role of scholars in
the formation of law is diminishing and is "now close to nominal,"
and, moreover, that the credibility of textbook writers has declined
as cognizance has been taken that "what international lawyers care
to describe as international law is their own invention," that "the
legal order was all the scholar saw about him, for it was an order of
37. M. KAPLAN, SYSTEM AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1957).
38. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (R. Snyder, H.W. Bruck & B. Sapin eds.
1962).
39. E.g., Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
declares "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations"
to be a subsidiary means for determining the rules of international law. In Justice
Gray's opinion,
... (W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legis-
lative act, or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience,
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals...
for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. Paquette Habana,
Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
40. W. GouLD. AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (1957).
41. Singer, supra note 11, at 62-63.
42. Onuf, Law-Making in the Global Community: A Working Paper, May 10, 1974
(unpublished paper prepared for presentation at the conference on "Law-Making in
the Global Community," Center of International Studies, Princeton University).
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his own making, an artifactual order." Acknowledging this proclivity
certainly undermines the function of textbook writers as sources of
international law, but does not vitiate the use of legal texts for the
purpose pursued here. Whether the descriptions provided by legal
texts are artifactual is immaterial, for we are not interested in observ-
ing the actual content of the law (whatever that may be) but rather
what people believe about the rules of the international system. The
opinions expressed by these scholars, whether valid or not, continue
to create and communicate attitudes about the nature of interna-
tional society, and the images provided thus invariably continue to
influence and modify the development of the actual law. Thus these
beliefs remain important indicators of the international political cul-
ture, regardless of whether they accurately reflect the law itself.
(5) The operational rules for the most part are designed to en-
hance the validity of the indicators by employing a low level-of-
measurement; that is, most variables are measured at the nominal
or ordinal level on the conviction that that level is appropriate
for concepts that are not open to interval measurement43 such as
norms. Thus, by asking such questions as whether a particular source
discusses a particular transnational norm (coded yes-no at the nomi-
nal level) or the proportionate amount of attention given to that norm
in the text (coded high to low at the ordinal level), our confidence in
the validity of the measures is increased. We are more confident of
data coded at this level because that is all data regarding rules are
able to yield, in our opinion.
(6) To treat publicists as "expert observers" appears reasonable,
on the face of it, because their writings are explicitly designed to
describe the "character of the system" at the point in time at which
they were writing. Moreover, for the famous scholars whose works
have gone through many editions (e.g., Oppenheim/Lauterpacht
went through eight editions from 1905 to 1955; Hall went through
eight editions from 1880 to 1924; von Liszt made eleven revisions of
his treatise; there are twenty-four editions of Martens' text), the com-
mentaries of each edition have been revised to reflect perceived
changes in the normative structure of the international system. Thus,
in principle, changes in their treatments serve as instructive indica-
tors of changes in the opinions statesmen held about the nature of he
international political system, and the chronology provided permits
us to monitor how the system of rules has changed over time. What
publicists perceive the system permitting and prohibiting, therefore,
may be monitored to trace and detect changes in the rules statesmen
subscribe to.
43. H. BLALOCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS 17, 40 (1960).
1975
436 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Whether one finds the above reasoning acceptable will most
likely be a function of the analytic paradigm from which one is work-
ing" rather than the cogency, or lack thereof, of the argument. The
rationale does, however, serve to explicitly identify what the author
regards as an appropriate research strategy for dealing with an admit-
tedly difficult research problem.
IV. RESEARCH UTILITY OF THE DATA SET
For years the study of value change has been a central topic in intellec-
tual, political and social history. Unfortunately, speculating about causes
and consequences of value change is far easier than determining accur-
ately the magnitude and direction of such change. 5
While Namenwirth and Lasswell were speaking in reference to
the study of American values, their statement is equally valid as a
description of the study of changes in transnational rules. Impression
and subjective belief about fluctuations in the normative structure of
the international system have yet to be replaced by measurement and
verifiable knowledge. The data generated here is designed to meet
this perceived need. Like Namenwirth and Lasswell, the general
question to which this proposed study is addressed is: What have
been the long-range changes in the rules governing the international
system, and what questions do the observed changes raise about the
causes and consequences of legal rule change?
V. SOME SUGGESTIVE HYPOTHESES FOR INVESTIGATION
In pursuit of that general goal, and in conformity with the re-
search strategy described above, the study proposed here will employ
the TRIP data to confront with evidence some prevailing impressions
regarding the extent to which particular transnational rules relevant
to the control of violence have fluctuated over time in order to ascer-
tain the plausibility of those impressions. That is, we will seek to
empirically describe the evolution of transnational rules across time
rather than attempt to devise explanations of observed fluctuations."
44. I.e., "traditionalists" will undoubtedly regard any effort to measure ideas
about transnational rules as absurd, while "behavioralists" will be inclined to see any
treatment of legal rules as unwarranted and a wasteful expenditure of research energy,
in conformity with their general view that international law is irrelevant to the behav-
ior of nations.
45. Namenwirth & Lasswell, The Changing Language of American Values, in 1
SAGE PROFESSIONAL PAPERS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 5 (1970).
46. Ultimately, the nexus between changes in systemic behavior and changes in
the normative structure of the system may be addressed; such assessments would
consider such things as the impact which the growing number of nation-states and
international organizations exert on the nature of transnational norms, as well as the
relationship between the salience of particular normative systems and the magnitude
and frequency of war. An example of the latter type of inquiry would be an empirical
test of Wight's hypothesis that "when diplomacy is violent and unscrupuious, interna-
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This means that we will be conducting time-series univariate analysis
in order (1) to describe, via trend line interpretation, variations in the
performance of particular transnational rules, and (2) to measure
transformations in the rule system of the international community. 7
The literature on international law is fraught with impressionis-
tic statements and often contradictory conventional wisdoms about
the diachronic performance of particular rules which are amenable to
testing and precise respecification with the TRIP data. While deci-
sions as to which of these descriptive hypotheses should be included
in the study have been postponed until a thorough review of the
literature has been conducted, some examples for illustrative pur-
poses include the following:
Hypothesis 1: Since 1648, there has been a gradual limitation on the
rights of states in conflict conferred by the sovereignty principle.
Hypothesis 2: Since 1700, the central Grotian assumption of the
solidarity, or potential solidarity, of the states comprising the interna-
tional system has been replaced by a pluralist conception with respect to
the enforcement of legal rules governing violence."
Hypothesis 3: Throughout the history of the contemporary interna-
tional system (i.e., 1648-1975), the system has maintained that with re-
spect to rules relating to the legitimacy of war, a distinction should be
drawn between some wars, or acts of war, and others; some wars may be
legitimate while others are not. To assert that this notion has prevailed
across time in the system is to reject the hypothesis that during certain
periods neither the pacifist perspective (that no war or act of war is
legitimate) nor the militarist view (that any war or act of war is legiti-
mate) has ever prevailed."
A contending view to the above "invariant" hypotheses suggests:
Hypothesis 4: Since 1919 prohibitions against the resort to force
have increased; in 1919 the resort to war was not completely outlawed (it
was outlawed only in case certain pre-established proceedings seeking
peace proved useless); by 1925 (Locarno) the resort to war was prohibited;
by 1928 (Kellogg-Briand Pact) war both as a tool of self-help to right
international wrongs and as an act of national sovereignty to change
existing rights was renounced; since World War II, a return to the distinc-
tional law soars into the regions of natural law; when diplomacy acquires a certain
habit of cooperation, international law crawls in the mud of legal positivism." Wight,
Why Is There No International Theory?, in DIPLOMATIC INVESTIGATIONS 15, 29 (H.
Butterfield & M. Wight eds. 1968). The analysis of such a theoretical question is
possible with the data compiled by Singer and Small in the Correlates of War Project,
which the present data is expressly designed to complement. J.D. SINGER & M. SMALL,
THE WAGES OF WAR 1816-1965: A STATISTICAL HANDBOOK (1972).
47. Kegley & Hamilton, Approaches to the Measurement of Transformation in the
International System, April 24, 1974 (unpublished paper prepared for presentation at
the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago).
48. Bull, The Grotian Concept of International Society, in DIPLOMATIC
INVESTIGATIONS 51, 52, supra note 46.
49. Id. at 53-54.
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tion between kinds of war in determining legitimacy was manifest, but,
in general, aggression continues to be regarded as illegal in and of itself;
this contrasts with the view of Suarez in the classical system of the
seventeenth century that aggressive war was something both moral and
legal.10
Corollary 4.1: Since 1900 the traditional right of states to resort to
war to defend not only their legal rights but also in order to destroy the
legal rights of other states has been renounced."'
Hypothesis 5: The salience of the just war concept, in terms of the
amount of attention publicists allocate to it in their discussions of inter-
national law, has steadily declined through history but has witnessed a
modem resurgence with the advent of nuclear weapons.
Corollary 5.1: From circa 1850 to 1919, the just war concept is inter-
preted as dealing exclusively with the lawful conduct of war, whereas in
the classical system just and unjust causes of war were distinguished.12
Corollary 5.2: Since the First World War the Grotian distinction
between just and unjust causes of war has been written into positive
international law.5
Hypothesis 6: In the classical international system, a state which is
party to a belligerent relationship with another state but which is "seek-
ing to uphold the law" is regarded as bound by no obligations, whereas
the "unjust" belligerent is regarded to enjoy no rights; in the contempo-
rary system (post-1900) the laws of war regarding belligerents are re-
garded as reciprocal-the rules of war apply equally to both parties in a
conflict."4
Hypothesis 7: The laws of war governing the conduct of belligerents
has gradually, but steadily, become less permissive (e.g., the laws of war
no longer permit belligerents to kill all those in enemy territory including
women and children, to destroy sacred enemy property, to kill captives
and hostages, or to make slaves of prisoners of war; at one time, all these
practices were permitted).S
Hypothesis 8: In the classical international system (circa 1648) the
rules of war espoused collective security principles (i.e., if a war breaks
out in which one party has a just cause, all other states have a right to
join in the struggle); gradually, this rule was replaced by a balance of
power conception which recognized the rights of neutrals to refrain from
involvement in conflicts between other parties; by 1919, the system re-
turned to the collective security principle, only to discard it again for the
balance of power concept in 1945.
Corollary 8. 1: Since 1919, the traditional right to remain neutral has
been weakened.7
Hypothesis 9: Rebus sic stantibus rules regarding alliance commit-
50. A.V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 14-23 (1972).
51. Bull, supra note 48, at 69.
52. Id. at 55.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 57-58.
55. Id. at 58.
56. Id.; I. CLAUDE, JR., POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1962); W. COPLIN,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1971).
57. Bull, supra note 48, at 62.
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ments under conditions of war have gradually, since circa 1900, been
replaced by pacta sunt servanda (treaties are binding) conceptions.
Hypothesis 10: The classical (circa 1648-1700) recognition of individ-
ual human beings as subjects of international law and members of inter-
national society in their own right gradually receded to the notion that
only states are members, but has been resurrected in recent (post-1940)
history.
Corollary 10. 1: The classical right of the individual citizen to refuse
to bear arms on behalf of his society for a war he believes to be unjust
has virtually disappeared in the present century.5
Hypothesis 11: The 18th century was dominated by natural law
thinking; the 19th, and particularly the latter half of the 19th century,
was dominated by positivism; the 20th century has witnessed a modern
resurgence of natural law orientations.5.
Corollary 11.1: In periods where positivism was dominant, interna-
tional law considered every state to have the right to make war as an
attribute of sovereignty.u
Hypothesis 12: The classical concept of aggression (direct military
operations by regular national forces under government control) has been
gradually extended and expanded in scope so as to include rules dealing
with new issue-areas and types of acts (e.g., economic pressures, threats,
propaganda, etc.)."
Corollary 12.1: The classic prohibition against military interventory
acts has been gradually relaxed by qualifications permitting new forms
of interventory behavior.
These hypotheses are merely suggestive of the types of longitudinal
descriptive statements which are amenable to testing with the TRIP
data. As the hypotheses are verbally stated here, the need for greater
precision through quantitative measurement becomes obvious. While
we know, as Rosecrance 2 has recently posited, that different perspec-
tives toward warfare have existed at various times since 1700, preci-
sion requires that these perspectives be identified (so we can ascer-
tain their presence or absence on the basis of evidence rather than
opinion) and charted. When changes in transnational rules are ob-
served, they may be interpreted as evidence of the emergence of new
"mapping" rules regarding international warfare and may, therefore,
be taken as empirical manifestations of a transformation of the nor-
mative dimension of the structure of the international system.63 That
is, we may probe the data to discover if periodicities exist. It is to this
end that this project is directed.
58. Id. at 64.
59. M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1961); W. GOULD, supra note 40 at 72.
60. A.V.W. THOMAS, supra note 50, at 15-16.
61. Id. at 69-92.
62. R. ROSECRANCE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: PEACE OR WAR? (1973).
63. Kegley & Hamilton, supra note 47.
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